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Abstract—It has been suggested that decision 
making depends on sensitive feelings associated 
with cognitive processing rather than cognitive 
processing alone. From human lesions, we know 
the medial anterior inferior-ventral prefrontal 
cortex processes the sensitivity associated with 
cognitive processing, it being essentially 
responsible for decision making.  
 In this fMRI (functional Magnetic Resonance 
Image) study 15 subjects were analyzed using 
moral dilemmas as probes to investigate the neural 
basis for painful-emotional sensitivity associated 
with decision making. We found that a network 
comprising the posterior and anterior cingulate 
and the medial anterior prefrontal cortex was 
significantly and specifically activated by painful 
moral dilemmas, but not by non-painful dilemmas.  
 These findings provide new evidence that the 
cingulate and medial anterior prefrontal are 
involved in processing painful emotional 
sensibility, in particular, when decision making 
takes place. We speculate that decision making 
has a cognitive component processed by cognitive 
brain areas and a sensitivity component processed 
by emotional  brain areas. The structures activated 
suggest that decision making depends on painful 
emotional feeling processing rather than cognitive 
processing when painful feeling processing 
happens. 
 
Index Terms: Cingulate cortex, Decision-making, 
Cognitive-emotional processing, Educational 
psychology, fMRI, Medial anterior inferior-ventral 
prefrontal cortex.  
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
 clear distinction between emotion and 
cognition has not been established. The so 
called “appraisal” of the processed painful 
sensitivity has been suggested to be the primary 
reason for any emotional behavior, which points 
to sensitivity rather than cognition as a causal 
explanation. Additionally, this last notion is 
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claimed to be applicable to emotional “order” and 
emotional “disorder" [1]. 
 On the other hand, the cognitive 
phenomenon is far from being understood. A 
modern neurologically based concept, the PASS 
(Planning, Attention, Simultaneous, Successive) 
theory of learning, deserves very close attention 
[2]. Its essential principle is central processing is 
independent of both sensorial input and verbal or 
non-verbal output. This idea is crucial to 
understanding that decision making has to do 
with personal beliefs, which work more 
unconsciously than consciously at a neurological 
level.  
 It is well known that physical pain processing 
and emotional processing share, at least in part, 
anatomical areas and physiological functions. 
This allows us to suppose that both physical and 
emotional painful sensitivity  are codified by the 
neurons as the same entity, in particular, as a 
danger signal for evolutionary reasons. Evidence 
from animal experiments indicates that painful-
fearful sensitivity is unconsciously processed and 
controlled by the temporal amygdala, which 
sends unconscious, uncontrolled, automatic 
protective-defensive responses, involving even 
the prefrontal cortex [3]. A common unspecific 
processing of danger occurs in different 
situations like stress, fear, etc. Thirdly, from the 
investigations on human lesions it has been 
shown that two prefrontal cortices, the emotional 
and the cognitive, exist. The decision making 
seems to depend on the emotional prefrontal 
cortex rather than on the cognitive prefrontal 
cortex . How is it that patients with medial  
prefrontal lesions are intelligent and aware of the 
consequences of the acts, but they exhibit 
unsocial behavior without remorse or decide to 
play a high-risk game with unnoticed 
consequences [4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10]?. Fourth, 
evidence exists that decision making  and feeling 
are interactive processes [2, 11].  
 The aim of this study was to dissociate the 
painful feeling processing network from the 
cognitive processing network and to associate 
the mental decision making act with the painful 
feeling processing network (emotional 
engagement).  According to neural correlates of 
emotion [12], we predicted that the crucial 
difference between painful and non-painful 
decision making  lies in the emotional 
engagement processing.  We have attempted to 
develop an informed symbiosis of psychological 
theory and neuroscience method. The present 
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study extends previous fMRI findings in decision 
making [13, 14]. These previous works compare 
a more painful  with a less painful decision 
making. Indeed, painful dilemmas must be 
considered "personal moral dilemmas", 
"impersonal moral dilemmas", "difficult personal 
moral dilemmas", "easy personal moral 
dilemmas", "utilitarian difficult personal moral 
dilemmas" and non-utilitarian difficult personal 
moral dilemmas". Our study compares a painful 
with a non-painful decision making.  
2. METHODS 
 We have designed an noninvasive fMRI study 
aimed to dissociate the painful-emotional 
prefrontal network from the cognitive network and 
to support that decision making depends on the 
emotional rather than on the cognitive prefrontal 
cortex. fMRI has no injected contrast or tracer 
and does not appear to have any risk with repeat 
exposure. Six males and nine females between 
12 and 15 years of age, who ( with their parents) 
were provided with written informed consent 
forms, were recruited from the local scholar 
community. The study was approved by the ethic 
committee. A medical screening was carried out 
to rule out any psychiatric or neurological illness 
or any medical condition or medication. All 
subjects were healthy and right-handed with 
average or above-average intelligence (WISC-III-
R). The stimuli selected were dilemmas. These 
were divided into “emotional” and “non-
emotional” categories according to both their 
nature and the responses of 30 pilot participants , 
according to the evaluation of two independent 
coders (validation). No emotional dilemma was 
felt emotional for one person and non-emotional 
for another. The emotional dilemmas involve a 
painful experience (blame sentiment) whatever 
the decision. Two options (A and B) are possible. 
Option A and B are painful, although one of them 
is the most painful. The  selected non-emotional 
dilemmas are painless. We assume that 
“emotional dilemma” is emotionally engaging, 
which means an intensively badly felt (blame) 
sentiment depending on the decision making 
response. Blame sentiment is an experience 
involving painful-feeling sensitivity, although other 
different processes may be also operating.  
Testing materials were similar to those available 
online at 
www.sciencemag.org/cgi/content/full/293/5537/2
105/DC1.14, September,2001. Distinguishing 
between cognitive and emotional tasks can be 
argued as somewhat arbitrary for some cognitive 
component is always present. For this reason we 
are talking in terms of more or less a 
predominant cognitive component. To minimize 
the cognitive requirement we used a quasi-
passive viewing procedure, which reduces the 
linguistic cognitive component of the task to a 
minimum. This makes comparison between 
cognitive and emotional condition much easier. 
This task consists of viewing a picture (cartoon) 
that represents a selected emotional or non-
emotional dilemma. Every dilemma had to have a 
“yes” / ”no” response option with the minimal 
motion of the 1st or  2nd finger of the hand. As a 
previous instruction, the subjects were presented 
pictures similar to those used during the session. 
Once the task was understood, the subjects were 
presented a visual display with each dilemma in 
the form of a picture or cartoon. Alternating 
blocks of emotional and non-emotional dilemmas 
were presented in random order in a series of 
three blocks of ten trials each. Every participant 
responded to each dilemma while undergoing 
brain scanning by fMRI. Stimuli were projected 
onto a white screen located in front of the child 
and  automatically displayed for 5 s by means of 
a computerized system. A previous unpublished 
pilot study showed that this presentation rate 
allowed subjects to comfortably look at the 
picture and respond to it. Longer time on task 
tends to increase the involvement of cognitive 
network. The intertrial interval (ITI) lasted long 
enough to allow the hemodynamic response to 
return to baseline after each trial. During the ITI, 
participants viewed a fixation cross.  
 Anatomic and functional data were obtained 
with a 1.5 Tesla GE Signa scanner. For 
anatomical localization, scan parameters were: 
repetition time (TR), 3100 ms; echo time (TE), 30 
ms,  matrix, 256 x 256; FOV ( Field Of View), 22 
cm; slice thickness, 6 mm; 22 axial slices. For the 
functional scan, parameters were: TR, 2000 ms; 
TE, 40 ms; flip angle (FA), 90º; matrix, 256 x 160; 
FOV, 24 cm; 18 axial slices, 6 mm thick, 0 mm 
skip. Head motion was constrained by foam 
padding. At the end of each scanning session a 
T1-weighted structural image was acquired in 
each subject.            
 Data analysis were performed with SPM 99 
(Statistical Parametric Mapping. Wellcome 
Department of Cognitive Neurology, University 
College of London) and included motion 
correction and  smoothing [Gaussian filter = 8 
mm FWHM (Full Width at Half Maximum) ]. 
Individual analysis was performed by using the 
general linear model [15]  on normalized data 
(fixed effects model, high-pass filter = 108 sec, 
low-pass-filter = hrf, global scaling). SPGR 
(SPoiled GRadient echo pulse sequence) was 
normalized to T1 template [MNI (Montreal 
Neurologic Institute) stereotaxic space] in SPM 
99 and then used as a template to normalize the 
in-plane anatomy (sinc interpolation, 2-mm 
voxels). Contrast images for each subject were 
normalized (tri-linear interpolation, 1x1x1-mm 
voxels) by using the parameters from the in-
plane normalization. The contrast images were 
entered into a one-sample t-test across the 15 
subjects. Activation was averaged over  the 15 
subjects. Group analysis was performed with a 
random effects analysis [16]. According to the 
SPM approach, statistical contrasts are 
performed by essentially calculating an ANOVA 
across all of the images under consideration. 
Statistical maps were thresholded for significance 
(P < 0.01) and cluster size ( 20 voxels). A whole 
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brain analysis was made to identify voxels 
significantly more activated during emotional 
dilemmas than non-emotional dilemmas.  
3. RESULTS 
Whole brain analysis, performed to identify brain 
regions that showed greater activity for emotional 
dilemmas, showed that emotional dilemma 
condition had increased activity in a number of 
brain regions (Table 1). The most statistically 
significant activation was in the posterior 
cingulate (BA 23/30/31). Other significantly 
activated regions included the anterior cingulate 
(BA 24/25/32) and medial anterior inferior-ventral 
prefrontal (BA 10/11) (Fig. 1). The locations and 
Z-scores of peak activation in activated regions 
are shown in Table 1.The number of activated 
voxels is defined as the area under the difference 
distribution having Z scores. These areas were 
not significantly activated in non-emotional 
condition. In contrast, the dorsolateral prefrontal, 
angular gyrus, several regions of frontal, parietal 
and temporal cortex  were significantly more 
activated during non-emotional condition. This 
response has been shown in a number of studies 
across different methodologies.  
 
Table 1. Significant activation during emotional dilemmas    
                compared to non-emotional dilemmas 
_____________________________________________________ 
                                             Talairach Coordinates          
Brain region                            X           Y         Z          Z score             
Brodmann's Area 
_____________________________________________________ 
 
Frontal lobe 
Medial  prefrontal         
                                         -31         55         3             3.98                    
10 
                                            0          52      -12            3.86                     
10,11 
                                            7           62     -12             4.43                     
11 
                                          -10         46     -14             3.85                     
10,11          
 
Limbic structures 
Anterior cingulate gyrus    
 
                                           -10         26       -10            4.69                     
32,25 
                                              7          28        28            4.05                     
32,24 
                                              0          27        36            3.58                     
24,25 
                                              0          12        33            5.25                     
24,25 
                                             -3         24         33            4.07                     
24,25 
                                              6            3        45            4.33                     
24 
 
Posterior cingulate gyrus    
                                    
                                              0         -38        41             3.81                 
31   
                                            14         -38          7             4.92                     
30 
                                             -7          31        24             2.64                     
23   
                                            -12        -55        27             3.97                     
23                       
_____________________________________________________ 
 Voxelwise significance threshold P < .01; min cluster size 20 
voxels. 
 Activated voxels were required to have a Z value for a claimed  P.                                   
 
 
 
 
Fig. 1 DLPC: Dorso Lateral Prefrontal Cortex;   IAMPC: 
Inferior Anterior Medial Prefrontal Cortex;  ILPC: Inferior 
Lateral Prefrontal Cortex 
4. DISCUSSION  
 
The structures in this study are in agreement with 
the amygdala, anterior cingulate cortex, posterior 
cingulate cortex, insula, and  medial anterior 
inferior emotional prefrontal cortex being 
associated with emotional condition as opposed 
to non-emotional condition that are supported by 
classically cognitive external cortical areas [12].  
We count on evidences suggesting that the 
neural mechanism subserving both cognitive and 
emotional processing may be at least partially 
dissociated.  
The thalamus, amygdala, cingulate gyrus, 
orbitofrontal gyrus, insula, secondary 
somatosensory cortex, and angular gyrus are 
structures that form part of the physical (somatic 
and visceral) and emotional-painful feeling 
network, [3, 12, 13, 14, 17, 18 ]. Although our 
conceptual framework suggests that physical 
pain and emotional pain processing share an 
unspecific network, it does not exclude the 
existence of other specific networks [18].  
A substantial amount of fMRI evidence 
suggests a relationship between particular 
structures and the conscious versus unconscious 
nature of processing. Unconscious amygdala 
activation has been demonstrated. In contrast, 
the anterior cingulate cortex appears more 
frequently associated with processing the feeling 
related to the conscious cognitive component. 
The medial anterior ventral prefrontal cortex 
activates regardless of the conscious-
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unconscious cognitive component of the task. A 
rule can been proposed. The more conscious 
component is working, the more external-dorsal 
structure is also working, whatever cognitive-
emotional task is being processed. Conversely, 
the more unconscious the operation is on, the 
more the inferior-interior structure works. For 
instance, the most cognitive conscious structure 
is the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex responsible 
for working memory. However, the anterior 
cingulate cortex, an older internal structure, 
satisfies the earlier mentioned rule. The more 
conscious level processing is on, the more the 
dorsal region activates [18]. In fact, the anterior 
cingulate cortex seems more related to 
conscious processing, as concluded from 
recalling experiences [12]. We must remark that 
conscious processing is linked to both cognitive 
and emotional processing. Therefore, both 
cognitive and emotional tasks can activate it. 
That  anterior cingulate is associated with conflict 
or attention-to-action processing [14] could be 
explained because both tasks involve stressful 
processing, which would be a way of painful 
processing, something like a arousal state 
related to negative affective state [19].  In 
general, the more conscious the activity is 
required, the more the functionally associated 
structures appear on fMRI, and vice versa.  In 
conclusion our fMRI pattern is more compatible 
with unconscious processing than conscious 
processing.  
 According to the PASS conception [2, 20], 
the information processing stream should be 
analyzed in terms of sensorial-unimodal input 
network (primary areas), intermediate multimodal 
input-dependent networks (association areas) , 
central input-independent networks (highly  
distributed functional networks) , intermediate 
multimodal output-dependent networks, and 
unimodal output-dependent network (verbal and 
non-verbal). According to the previous reported 
fMRI results, the medial anterior inferior ventral 
prefrontal acts as an input/output independent 
area [12]. In regard to input-dependency, the 
anterior cingulate cortex, as well as the insula, 
has been mostly linked to recall input than to 
visual and auditory input [12]. Thus, it appears to 
be linked to language-mediated processes [12, 
21], which is not consistent with our study where 
language component of the task is reduced to a 
minimum. The input-dependency condition  
associates the activation with the input modality 
(visual or auditory), which must be taken into 
account to interpret  possible associations.    
 The amygdala may be considered a sensitive 
organ, something close to the “sensory-
perceptual level” [22, 23]. The anterior cingulate 
cortex appears to work at a higher level of 
processing with input-dependency. In contrast, 
the non-input dependent medial anterior 
prefrontal cortex may be considered to process 
the feeling of the cognitive content, working at an 
even higher functioning level. In other words, the 
neurons of the medial anterior prefrontal cortex 
presumably process and integrate both sensitivity 
and data cognitive information. In any case, the 
medial prefrontal cortex works as a higher order 
processor with higher discriminating capacity [3]. 
Conversely, the neurons of the dorsolateral 
prefrontal cortex presumably process exclusively 
conscious cognitive information.  
Particular attention should be given to the 
posterior cingulate cortex. Several fMRI results 
unequivocally link this structure to the non-
valence dependent emotional feeling and to the 
painful feeling network [21, 24 ] in both emotional 
order and emotional disorder.  Non-input-
dependency has been observed because it was 
consistently activated by verbal, pictorial, and 
recalling stimuli [25, 26]. A relationship between 
this cerebral area and the ocular saccade 
movements, especially when an emotional-
feeling task involving visual processing is 
occurring, has been reported [27]. Probably, the 
significant activation seen here is because an 
important quantity of information of the task is 
processed by the posterior brain. We suggest 
that the posterior cingulate is a relevant part of 
the painful feeling network linked to the cognitive 
posterior brain processor.         
The reported relationship between fRMI and 
similar techniques with the decision making 
process deserves attention  [9, 24, 28, 29, 30, 31 
].  What we are calling the emotional prefrontal, 
namely the medial anterior inferior ventral 
prefrontal, is involved in the painful decision 
making process. Our study on the process of 
decision making involving painful-feeling 
processing indicates that the emotional prefrontal 
processes painful-feeling associated with the 
corresponding cognitive processing and 
determines the emotional response associated 
with the thought. We are unable to state whether 
the medial  prefrontal neurons process only 
painful feeling sensitivity or process both 
sensitivity and informative cognitive data 
(cognitive concept used here) in an integrated 
way. Our contention is that the medial prefrontal 
cortex processes feeling sensitivity, but the 
cognitive dorsolateral prefrontal does not. 
Something like the somatotopic differentiation 
between motor cortex and sensitive cortex. This 
conclusion is in agreement with the lesion studies  
that indicate the lesion in these areas brings 
about a failure in logical decision making [2, 4, 
10]. This involves a failure in foreseeing the 
consequences of the acts. In fact, it must be 
considered a failure in feeling rather than 
knowing the consequences [10]. Probably, that is 
why  these patients exhibit unsocial behavior 
without remorse and an indifference to playing a 
high-risk game with unnoticed consequences 
[10].  
 We can reasonably deduce by comparing 
these fMRI results with other scientific evidences 
that   the essential concept universally agreed 
upon is that independent of the behavior that is 
put in action, both cognitive (ideas) and feeling 
(sensitivity) processing happen at neurological 
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level. That is, whether consciously or 
unconsciously, all action is really driven by both 
cognitive and affective-feeling processing. We 
believe our study demonstrates that painful 
decision making, but not non-painful decision 
making, activates the medial prefrontal. This can 
also be taken from the lesion studies. For 
instance, a patient with an emotional prefrontal 
lesion unsociably behaves because their 
emotional prefrontal is not processing or 
codifying the painful feeling associated with the 
corresponding cognitive processing. This is not 
because their cognitive dorsolateral prefrontal 
along with their temporal, parietal, and occipital 
cortices are unable to understand which 
consequence follows which behavior [4, 10].  
 The next thing to keep in mind is that painful 
feeling sensitivity is neurologically experienced in 
countless circumstances, we call countless 
linguistic terms, such as  anxiety, depression, 
stress, fear, anger, and worry, as well as in 
unthinkable circumstances like aggression and 
violence. Likewise,  "the empathy for pain" [18] or 
the experience of regret [4] and of punishment 
[31, 32] are  painful experiences,  which activate 
the brain areas linked to emotional painful 
processing. Recent neuroimaging studies 
continue to explore the neural correlates of 
decision making  [17].   Our study compares 
painful  with non-painful dilemmas, which is 
different from previous studies where more 
painful dilemmas are compared with less painful 
ones [13, 14]. For evolutionary reasons, it must 
be emphasized that neurons similarly codify as a 
danger what we call the countless linguistic 
terms, in particular blame sentiment, involved in 
our emotional dilemmas. More and more 
neurological evidence indicates that the painful 
sensitivity processing network counts on neurons 
processing and codifying sensitivity, but not 
cognitive informative data, even for the cognitive 
prefrontal, the cognitive cerebral lobe par 
excellence. In fact, this described functional 
mechanism agrees with what we now know 
about painful-fearful feeling processing in 
animals [3]).  
 According to our theory, many different tasks 
can activate the areas of our study, but also other 
different areas depending of the nature of the 
task. We postulate that the task used here 
allowed us to dissociate a sensitivity network 
from a cognitive network. We suggest that a 
longer time for response than that employed here 
involves the engagement of brain areas 
commonly associated with deliberative thought 
processes, which means a confound factor to 
dissociate the cognitive from the emotional 
(sensitivity) network. Moreover, we postulate that 
the deliberative thought associated with longer 
times for response reflects the engagement of 
conscious abstract reasoning processes, which 
happens later than the unconscious reasoning-
feeling associated with the unconscious personal 
beliefs processing responsible for the response 
(decision making) when painful feeling 
processing takes place. It would be a reasoning 
process occurring after the point of decision [14]. 
The response would be in accordance with 
"unconscious" judgement of the personal beliefs. 
In support of this, we can mention the cognitive-
psychological evidence that demonstrates the 
dissociation between verbal report and action. 
That is, a child is solving a task and we can verify 
that the verbally reported ("a posteriori" abstract 
reasoning ) strategy is not that really being used, 
which we can deduce by observing the eye 
movements. That is, the unconscious strategy 
may be opaque to introspection. For example, 
the child is solving a task of searching for a 
number embedded in a field of other numbers. 
When asked how the target was located , we can 
see that screening eye movements tell us a 
different action than that verbally reported.    [2]. 
Likewise, in an experiment [33], adult subjects 
were asked to do decision making tasks and a 
dissociation between verbal report and action 
was noticed frequently.  
 Guilty feeling processing is involved in the 
resolution (decision making) of the emotional 
dilemmas. Decision making involves the 
processing of personal beliefs. Personal beliefs 
influence decision making. Personal beliefs work 
basically at a central subconscious level beyond 
what we externally can see or hear between the 
input of information (dilemma presented) and the 
output of information (behavioral response). In 
pure PASS cognitive terms, for example, a child 
is presented with single separated letters, such 
as u, b, and s. He/she is asked to pronounce the 
successive combination [b u s], and he/she 
answers correctly. Later, he/she is asked to 
pronounce the sequence [q u s], and the answer 
is the same as before; this is obviously the 
incorrect answer. However, if the knowledge 
mentally processed is the symbol “b” is 
pronounced  “/b/”  independently of placing it 
right side up or not, then good logical reasoning 
has happened, because “a chair remains a chair 
whether its feet are on the floor or pointing 
toward the ceiling”. The response may be 
considered the consequence of  a mental 
decision making act. What matters in decision 
making  is the central mental processing in terms 
of beliefs [2]. This act involves both cognitive and 
feeling processing. In the case of painful feeling 
processing, according to animal experimentation, 
the neurons at the amygdala are inferred to be 
codifying danger, which determines that the  
medial prefrontal becomes active [3].We suggest 
that this central cognitive-sensitive processing is 
supported by the medial  prefrontal according to 
our results. 
5. CONCLUSION  
 
The results of this study suggest that we can 
identify an emotional-painful processing network 
different from a cognitive processing network. 
The structures we observed are those being 
activated when painful feelings (in the form of 
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blame sentiment in our study) are being 
processed. The structures activated, on the other 
hand, suggest that the decision making process 
depends on painful emotional feeling processing 
rather than cognitive processing when painful 
feeling processing happens. Future studies to 
further elucidate the functional significance of this 
fMRI activation, which allows us to establish not 
only diagnostic patterns but also the patterns in 
response to various treatments, will be needed. 
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